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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIA T. ALVAREZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
PAUL PAULUS and 
STOVER BEDDING AND 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
a Corporation, 
Defendents and Respondents 
Case 
No. 8895 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
A jury with all of the evidence before them, and it 
might be pointed out that all of the evidence came from 
witnesses called on behalf of the appellant, decided the 
issues of fact in the present case in defendants' favor. 
The disputed issues of fact as outlined in the pre-trial 
order (R. 10) as applicable to this appeal are as follows: 
1. Was Paul Paulus negligent as claimed by the 
plaintiff~ 
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2. Was the plaintiff negligent as claimed by the 
defendants 1 
3. Was such negligence, if any, a proximate cause of 
the injuries received by Maria Elena Ontiveros 1 
Since the jury returned a verdict of No Cause of 
Action (R. 196) we must conclude that they arrived at 
such a verdict by concluding one of the following: 
(1) The defendant Paul Paulus was not negligent as 
claimed by the plaintiff, nor was the plaintiff negligent, or 
(2) The plaintiff and defendants both were negli-
gent and their respective negligences were proximate 
causes of the injuries, or 
(3) The defendant, Paul Paulos, was not negligent 
but that the plaintiff was negligent and her negligence 
·was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained. 
As no special interrogatories were requested we shall 
never know which of the above propositions was the con-
clusion of this jury. 
This situation was expressed in Pettingill v. Perkins, 
2 Ut. 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 at page 187: 
''The verdict, no cause of action, is not necessarily 
predicated upon the ground of the negligence of 
the mother. The jury might well haYe found that 
there was no negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. It would take a pull and a long stretch 
to say the evidence required the conclusion that 
defendant was guilty of negligence which proxi-
mately caused the death of the child." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant in her brief has made a statement of 
the physical facts of where the child was and where the 
truck was driven, but has conveniently failed to indicate 
what the persons involved were doing. 
For purposes of clarification, the respondents will 
give a brief description of the activities of the plaintiff 
and of the defendant, Paul Paulus, which activities are 
undisputed by the evidence. 
When l\Ir. Paulus reached the point between 226 and 
228 Emeril Avenue (Ex. 14) he stopped (P-1 Ex. 19) 
(R. 49) and left his truck, told the children to move back 
and then slowly backed out of Emeril Avenue (R. 49) 
and in so doing he stopped the truck again (R. 73) and 
honked his horn (R. 74). 
Upon reaching (P-4 Ex.l9) (R. 55) Mr. Paulus again 
left the truck and ''7 ent around it (R. 58) and cautioned 
the children to stand back, then in backing slowly he 
honked (R. 70) and looked in his mirrors (R. 62) and 
observed the three children constantly (R. 63). 
It is to be noted that appellant's witnesses substan-
tiated these facts. Mrs. Romero said the defendant Paulus 
got out of his truck, talked to the children, honked his 
horn, and drove slowly (R. 111). Mrs. Wittke stated she 
heard :Mr. Paulus holler at the kids two different times 
and stop twice (R. 107). Witness Willy Valdez, called by 
appellant, also testified that Mr. Paulus honked his horn, 
told the children to get out of the way and got out of the 
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truck to tell the children to move back (R. 91). It is to be 
noted that Maria Elena was not one of the children re-
ferred to here and the only two people to observe her 
prior to the accident were :Mrs. Romero and Willy Valdez. 
During the period of time from the first time the 
truck was driven forward into Emeril Avenue to the 
point between 226 and 228 Emeril, until the accident 
itself, the plaintiff testified that she was doing the family 
wash (R. 118) and allowed the three pre-school children, 
including _i\Iaria Elena, age 22 months, to play on the 
front porch, even though she observed the large truck on 
Emeril Avenue (R. 119) going in and coming out; that 
she then went back to check on the wash (R. 120) and the 
accident occurred before her return (R. 121). 
STATE:\IEXT OF POIXTS 
POIXT ONE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
SUBMIT THE THEORY OF APPELLANT OF 
FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY AS NEGLI-
GENCE, SINCE SAME NEVER WAS DEVELOPED 
AS AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE AND INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7 WAS THEREFORE IN ORDER. 
POINT T\YO 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE 
QUESTION OF ACCIDENT AS A DEFENSE TO 
THE JURY, AND APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED BY 
HER OWN REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
FROM CLAIMING ERROR. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE 
QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
TO THE JURY AND APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED 
FROM CLAIMING ERROR BY HER OWN RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
SUBMIT THE THEORY OF APPELLANT OF 
FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY AS NEGLI-
GENCE, SINCE SAME NEVER WAS DEVELOPED 
AS AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE AND INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7 WAS THEREFORE IN ORDER. 
Each party to a suit is entitled to have his theory, 
when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the jury 
and the judgment of the jury on the facts tending to sup-
port such theory, assuming always that there is testimony 
offered to support the same. Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 
41 Utah 121, 124 Pac. 522 . 
. Again in Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 
Pac. (2d) 309, this court has said a party has a right to 
have his theory of the case go to the jury ''if the evidence 
would justify reasonable men in following his theory.'' 
It is submitted that Appellant offered absolutely no 
evidence that the child had a right of way superior to the 
Respondent at the time of this accident. Appellant pre-
sents on page 15 of her brief a rather interesting theory 
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that since Respondent Paulus at Point 4 (Ex. 19) was east 
of the right of way called Emeril Avenue and his ultimate 
destination was past the west end of Emeril Avenue that 
Paulus was therefore a trespasser on the right of way at 
the time of the accident. Such is not the law and it is noted 
Appellant quotes no statute nor cases to substantiate this 
theory. 
The pre-trial order did not, as Appellant claims, set 
out a Failure to Yield Right of Way as an issue in this 
case. Rather, the pre-trial order stated that it was the 
contention of the plaintiff (R. 9) that defendant Paulus 
was negligent in that he failed to yield to Maria Elene 
Ontiveros the right of way to which she was entitled 
(R. 10). 
It is submitted that Appellant failed to produce any 
evidence at the trial to substantiate this contention and 
therefore it could not become an issue of fact for the 
jury to determine. 
POIXT T\VO 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE 
QUESTION OF ACCIDENT AS A DEFENSE TO 
THE JURY, AND APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED BY 
HER OWN REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
FROM CLAIMING ERROR. 
Appellant proposed Instruction ~o. 4 (R. 151) as 
follows: 
''You are instructed that the mere fact that 
an accident occurred is no evidence of negligence 
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and the fact that this accident occurred is no indi-
cation that the plaintiff or defendants were 
negligent.'' 
In the light of this proposed instruction it is difficult 
to see how Appellant can now complaint of Instruction 
No. 6 being submitted to the jury. Instruction No. 6 
(R. 182) is as follows: 
"The mere fact that the Deceased was struck 
and killed by a truck being backed by the Defend-
ant Paul Paulus does not in and of itself support 
an inference that he was guilty of negligence that 
was a proximate cause of the injury and death of 
the Deceased, nor does it support an inference 
that the Plaintiff is guilty of negligence in her 
care and supervision of the child. The law recog-
nizes that there are occasions when the operators 
of motor vehicles strike and inflict serious bodily 
injury or death upon pedestrians under circum-
stances where the driver of such vehicle or the 
pedestrian or person responsible for the safety' of 
the pedestrian use due care. In such cases, there 
is no liability in law upon the persons involved." 
Pettingell v. Perkins, 2 Ut. 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185-at 
page 196 of the Pacific Reporter the Court says : 
''Furthermore, it is well established that a party 
cannot assign as error the giving of his own re-
quests. He cannot lead the court into error and 
then be heard to complain thereof. To permit such 
action would needlessly prolong litigation, so there 
might never be an end thereto. Having by his own 
pleadings, evidence and instructions tried and 
rested the case upon the theory that the mother's 
negligence would bar the father, he is bound 
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thereby, as the law of the case. He cannot now on 
appeal shift his theory and position.'' 
·rhe Court quotes the following cases on this same 
rule: Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P. 2d, 969, and 
Kirchgestner v. Denver & R. G., 218 P. 2d 685. 
In Thomas v. Frost, 83 Utah 207, 27 P. 2d 459, the 
court presented the rule that a defendant could not, on 
appeal, complain of statements in plaintiff's instruction 
to same effect as statement in defendant's requested 
instruction. 
The annotation to Sec. 16.1-Jury Instruction Forms 
-Utah, on Unavoidable Accidents, refers favorably to 
Parker v. Womack, 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P. 2d 823, wherein 
the Court held that unless the defendant is guilty of neg-
ligence as a matter of law it is proper for the court to 
give an instruction on unavoidable accident. 
Appellant claims error in that the court did not in-
clude in Instruction No. 6 a charge that Respondent 
Paulus had a greater degree of care by reason of the pres-
ence of children. It is well known that all the instructions 
are to be ''considered and construed as a whole,'' Instruc-
tion No. 18 (R. 195). In Instruction No. 5 (R. 181) the 
Court recited the degree of care that both Appellant and 
Respondent had under the existing circumstances and 
Appellant has claimed no error as to that instruction. 
Further, Respondents contend that the giving of the 
instruction was not prejudicial to the Appellant. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE 
QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
TO THE JURY AND APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED 
FROM CLAIMING ERROR BY HER OWN RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11. 
It would appear that the Appellant is estopped from 
claiming the submission of the question of contributory 
negligence to the Jury by reason of her proposed Jury 
Instruction No. 11 (R. 158): 
''You are instructed that the defense of negligence 
of the plaintiff may be involved in an action by 
the parent to recover damages for the death of 
the child. 
''In determining whether or not the plaintiff in 
this case was negligent, you must decide whether 
or not plaintiff exercised that degree of care and 
supervision of the minor child as any reasonable 
and prudent person would have done under the 
same circumstances. 
"If you find that Julia T. Alvarez did not exercise 
that degree of care and supervision of the minor 
child as any reasonable and prudent person woultl 
have done under the same circumstances, and that 
her failure to do so, was a proximate cause or the 
sole proximate cause of the accident, then you 
should return a verdict in favor of the defendants 
even though you might also find that the defendant 
Paul Pal us was negligent in some respect.'' 
It is therefore submitted as elementary that to permit 
an Appellant to lead the trial court into error by request-
ing an instruction which he feels is error would be ( 1) 
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Unfair to the lower Court and the opposite party; (2) An 
approval of planned delay and expense to litigants and 
( 3) An affirmance by this Court of a rule that the termi-
nation of litigation shall not be foreseeable. 
The Appellant by her action has waived her right to 
complain and is estopped now from doing so. The Court 
is again referred to the cases quoted under Respondents' 
Point Two. 
It is acknowledged that the burden of proof as to 
contributory negligence rests with the respondent and 
whether that proof is secured by the testimony of 
Appellant's witnesses is immaterial. Certainly the testi-
mony of the Appellant as contained in the record from 
R. 118 to R. 121 is sufficient to take the question of con-
tributory negligence to the jury as indicated and approved 
by Appellant's Instruction No. 11. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it appears that the jury after a fair and 
impartial trial in which all of the evidence presented to 
them was given by Appellant's own witnesses, and after 
hving been properly instructed on the issues of the case 
as formulated at the Pre-Trial, decided the issues of this 
case in favor of the Respondents. Not only is there suf-
ficient evidence from which the jury might have reason-
ably so determined the issues of this case but it must be 
kept in mind that their verdict could have been based on 
any one of three findings, namely : 
10 
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( 1) Respondent was not negligent. 
(2) Appellant was contributorily negligent. 
(3) Appellant only was negligent. 
It is therefore most respectfully urged by the Re-
spondent that the judgment on verdict of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EMMETT L. BROWN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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